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Politics and Constitutional Jurisgenesis: 
A Cautionary Note on Political Constitutionalism 
 
MING-SUNG KUO 
<Abstract> 
This paper aims to provide an alternative account of political constitutionalism by situating it 
in a broader process of constitutional politics than the traditional court vs parliament debate 
has suggested.  Drawing upon Robert Cover’s distinction between the jurispathic and the 
jurisgenerative constitution, I argue that parliamentary decision-making is not necessarily 
more congenial to a jurisgenerative constitutional order than judicial review as political 
constitutionalists contend.  I trace the jurispathic character of current scholarship on 
political constitutionalism to the presupposition of institutional sovereignty in a narrow 
understanding of constitutional politics, which its defenders share in common with the 
supporters of judicial supremacy.  To move towards a robust version of non-court-centred 
jurisgenerative constitutionalism, which I call constitutional jurisgenesis, we need to rethink 
the place of politics in a constitutional order.  From Cover’s idea of constitutional nomos I 
take two further lessons for this new understanding of constitutional politics.  First, 
constitutional theory should reconsider the role of institutional sovereignty in the relationship 
between law and politics in constitutional orders.  Second, to engage the people in 
constitutional politics, we need to shift attention from the popular sovereignty-centred debate 
to constitutional narratives, which are oriented towards nomos-building. 
[Keywords] narratives and nomos, Robert Cover, legal constitutionalism, political 
constitutionalism, constitutional jurisgenesis, institutional sovereignty, popular sovereignty, 
jurisgenerative constitution, judicial supremacy vs parliamentary sovereignty, constitutional 
jurispathy  
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I. INTRODUCTION 
Despite its roots in the British constitutional context, the debate between political and 
legal constitutionalism has found expression beyond the British Isles and other Westminster 
democracies.1  One prominent feature of the recent developments in the global constitutional 
landscape is the adoption of some form of judicial/ constitutional review in more and more 
jurisdictions, regardless of political traditions.2  As judicial review has long been taken as a 
                                                 
1 Compare A Tomkins, ‘What‘s Left of the Political Constitution?’ (2013) 14 German Law Journal 2275, 
2275-76, with M Tushnet, ‘The Relationship Between Political Constitutionalism and Weak-Form Judicial 
Review’ (2013) 14 German Law Journal 2249. 
2  For the introduction of judicial review into the Commonwealth countries, see S Gardbaum, The New 
Commonwealth Model of Constitutionalism: Theory And Practice (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 
2013).  For the spread of judicial review to new constitutional democracies, see e.g., T Ginsburg, Judicial Review 
in New Democracies: Constitutional Courts in Asian Cases (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2003); W 
Sadurski, Rights Before Courts: A Study of Constitutional Courts in Postcommunist States of Central and Eastern 
Europe (Springer, Dordrecht, 2005).  As my focus is on the (quasi-)judicial review of the constitutionality of 
legislation by the national legislature (or its compatibility with a super-statute-like bill of rights as appropriate), I 
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core institutional feature of constitutional democracy, 3  the judicial enforceability of a 
constitution appears to be the defining feature of constitutionalism, suggesting the dominance 
of legal constitutionalism in the new global constitutional landscape.4  Echoing the British 
debate surrounding the Human Rights Act 1998 (HRA), however, this legalist understanding 
raises some fundamental issues about constitutional order.  Among them is the judicial 
intervention in democratic politics, stopping the political community from resolving 
fundamental issues through further deliberation and other democratic means. 5   Settling 
disputes through judicial decisions instead of democratic political processes seems to give the 
judiciary the final say over the interpretation of the constitution.  To legal constitutionalism 
is attributed the withering of constitutional meaning.  Judicial review curtails the 
development of constitutionalism.  So goes political constitutionalism.6 
Seen in this light, the seemingly unending debate between political and legal 
constitutionalists centres on the role of courts vis-à-vis the political branches in decision-
making in constitutional orders.  I find this court-centred debate unduly limited.  To throw 
light on the broad implications of the political vs legal constitutionalism debate to the global 
constitutional landscape, I shall provide an alternative account of political constitutionalism in 
this paper by drawing upon the distinction between the jurispathic and the jurisgenerative 
                                                 
use judicial and constitutional review interchangeably unless otherwise specified.  For the concept of super-
statute, see WN Eskridge, Jr and J Ferejohn, ‘Super-Statutes’ (2001) 50 Duke Law Journal 1215. 
3 KE Whittington, ‘An “Indispensable Feature”? Constitutionalism and Judicial Review’ (2002) 6 New York 
University Journal of Legislation & Public Policy 21, 22.   
4 Tushnet (n 1). 
5 J Waldron, Law and Disagreement (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1999) 8-10. 
6  R Bellamy, Political Constitutionalism: A Republican Defence of the Constitutionality of Democracy 
(Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2013) 147-54. 
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constitution that Robert Cover made famous. 7   Pace the intuition of political 
constitutionalists, I shall argue, the parliamentary (or legislative) process is not necessarily 
more congenial to constitutional politics than judicial review.  Departing legal 
constitutionalism, constitutional orders still face the contestation between jurisgenerative and 
jurispathetic politics.  Notably, the idea of ‘jurisgenerative politics’ has been picked up and 
further elaborated by scholars engaged in the debate over the relationship between democracy 
and the rule of law following the ‘republican revival’ such as Frank Michelman, Jürgen 
Habermas, and Seyla Benhabib. 8   As I shall show, jurisgenerative politics, as Cover 
envisaged it, is far more than a procedural approach to democracy as those scholars have 
suggested.  Only when citizens engage in the contentious debate over public issues and 
thereby play a role in engendering the meaning of the political community not only in 
procedural but also in substantive terms should (and can) politics be considered 
jurisgenerative.9  This is why Cover’s ‘original’ version of jurisgenerative politics that rests 
on the dialectic of narratives and counternarratives deserves a close read, which I aim to 
provide in this paper.  Learning lessons from Cover, political constitutionalists should shift 
focus from the institutional relationship between the court and the legislature to the way that 
                                                 
7 RM Cover, ‘The Supreme Court, 1982 Term -- Foreword: Nomos and Narrative’ (1983) 97 Harvard Law 
Review 4.  
8 F Michelman, ‘Law’s Republic’ (1988) Yale Law Journal 1493; J Habermas, Between Facts and Norms: 
Contributions to a Discourse Theory of Law and Democracy (trans W Rehg, MIT Press, Cambridge, MA, 
1996); S Benhabib, Another Cosmopolitanism (ed R Post, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2006).  See also S 
B Benhabib, Critique, Norm, and Utopia: A Study of the Foundations of Critical Theory (Columbia University 
Press, New York, NY, 1986).  Robert Post discusses whether civic republicanism would have changed Cover’s 
radical view on jurigenerative politics had ‘Nomos and Narrative’ not been published prior to the republican 
revival.  RC Post, ‘Who’s Afraid of Jurispathic Courts?: Violence and Public Reason in Nomos and Narrative’ 
(2005) 17 Yale Journal of Law & the Humanities 9, 14-15.   
9 Cf WF Harris II, The Interpretable Constitution (Johns Hopkins University Press, Baltimore, 1993). 
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they can become constituents of broader constitutional politics. 
To get to the heart of Cover’s radical view of jurisgenerative politics, the role of narratives 
in his constitutional imagination needs to be brought to the fore in the first place.  As will be 
further discussed, storytelling is essential to narratives, which help to integrate seemingly 
isolated historical fragments into a meaningful whole.  For this reason, narratives are usually 
associated with strategic (re)constructions of social reality.10  In line with such constructivist 
position, Michael Ryan observes, Cover understood narratives ‘as [parts of] an ongoing story 
whose ending is less determined by what has already been conceived than by choices made 
regarding what has yet to be imagined’.11  As I shall show, it is through the interaction 
between ‘what has already been conceived’ and ‘what has yet to be imagined’ that narratives 
are pivotal to a jurisgenerative constitutional politics. 
To drive my point home, I shall first reconceive the relationship between law and politics, 
which lies at the heart of the political vs legal constitutionalism debate,12 in light of Cover’s 
observation of the exponential multiplication of constitutional meaning in ‘Nomos and 
Narrative’. 13   Under this view, neither the court nor the parliament is inherently 
                                                 
10 J Bruner, ‘The Narrative Construction of Reality’ (1991) 18 Critical Inquiry 1.  See also M Hyvärinen, 
‘Analyzing Narratives and Story-Telling’ in P Alasuutari et al (eds), The SAGE Handbook of Social Research 
Methods (SAGE, London, 2008) 447.  Notably, narratives play an increasing role in the constructivist school 
in theories of international relations.  See B Bliesemann de Guevara (ed), Myth and Narrative in International 
Politics: Interpretive Approaches to the Study of IR (Palgrave Macmillan, London, 2016).  See also T 
Flockhart, ‘Towards a Strong NATO Narrative: From a “Practice of Talking” to a “Practice of Doing”’ (2012) 
49 International Politics 78; V d Salla, ‘Political Myth, Mythology and the European Union’ (2010) 48 Journal 
of Common Market Studies 1.  For example, ‘strategic narratives’ have been proposed as a way to shape the 
structure and politics of the international order.  See generally A Miskimmon et al (eds), Forging the World: 
Strategic Narratives and International Relations (University of Michigan Press, Ann Arbor, MI, 2017).  
11 M Ryan, ‘Meaning and Alternity’ in M Minow et al (eds), Narrative, Violence and the Law: The Essays of 
Robert Cover (University of Michigan Press, Ann Arbor, MI, 1995) 267, 271. 
12 G Gee and GCN Webber, ‘A Grammar of Public Law’ (2013) 12 German Law Journal 2137, 2137. 
13 Cover (n 7). 
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jurisgenerative given their official role in a constitutional order.  With the inbuilt jurispathic 
character of both legal and political constitutionalism revealed, I shall continue to explore what 
we can learn from Cover with an eye to an alternative robust version of non-court-centred, 
political constitutionalism, which I call constitutional jurisgenesis.  I suggest that two lessons 
can be taken from Cover.  At the macro-level, constitutional politics must be reconceived 
without assuming an institutional sovereign, whether its holder is the court or the parliament;14 
at the micro-level, to engage the people in constitutional politics, we need to rethink how a 
constitution relates itself to the people by shifting attention from the debate surrounding 
popular sovereignty to constitutional narratives oriented towards nomos-building. 
II. CONSTITUTIONALISM AT THE CROSSROADS: LAW, POLITICS, 
AND CONSTITUTIONAL JURISGENESIS 
To rethink the relationship between law and politics at the heart of constitutionalism, I 
first provide a close read of Cover’s ‘Nomos and Narrative’ to disclose the distinction he made 
between the jurispathic and jurisgenerative constitution.  Following the discussion of why 
legal constitutionalism is regarded as jurispathic through the lens of ‘Nomos and Narrative’, I 
focus on the role of constitutional politics in nomos-building and further assess the relationship 
between political constitutionalism and constitutional jurisgenesis. 
A. Cover Uncovered: Discovering the Jurispathic Nature of Legal 
Constitutionalism 
Interpretation occupies the central place in law, aimed at discovering the meaning of the 
                                                 
14  I shall elaborate on the idea of institutional sovereignty under the heading ‘Lesson One: Dethrone 
Institutional Sovereigns’. 
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law in a concrete context. 15   Yet, in ‘Nomos and Narrative’, Cover suggested that the 
relationship between interpretation and meaning be reconceived in line with a new 
understanding of law.  To Cover, the law envisages a whole world, a normative synthesis that 
includes ‘legal precepts’ and ‘narratives’, which Cover called a ‘nomos’.16  To understand the 
legal institutions or prescriptions, we need to relate them to ‘the narratives that locate [them] 
and give [them] meaning’.17  Situated in this discursive context, the legal precepts are no 
longer the commands of authorities but have their ‘history and destiny, beginning and end’.18  
Thus, the enterprise to discover the meaning of the law goes beyond the application of the 
methods of legal interpretation.19  Given that the social reality in which legal interpretation is 
embedded results from our imagination, history, literature, and other narratives also find their 
way into the nomos and its interpretation.20  In sum, as the nomos comprises both legal rules 
and principles and their meaning-embedding narratives, to discover the meaning of law is more 
the understanding of the entire legal order than the interpretation of legal precepts.21 
Yet the foregoing duality of a nomos points to the ‘tension between reality and vision’ in 
law resulting from ‘the act of creative narrative’.22  Also, Cover noted that narratives play the 
intermediary role in the formation of a nomos by ‘relat[ing] our normative system to our social 
                                                 
15 Compare R Dworkin, A Matter of Principle (Harvard University Press, Cambridge, MA, 1985) 146-66, with 
JB White, Justice as Translation: An Essay in Cultural and Legal Criticism (University of Chicago Press, 
Chicago, 1990) 239-41, 244-46.  See also Harris (n 9) 2-7. 
16 Cover (n 7) 4.  Cover suggested that legal precepts include rules, principles, and other prescriptive norms 
on procedure, substance, and institution.  Ibid 7-8. 
17 Ibid 4. 
18 Ibid 5. 
19 Compare P Bobbitt, Constitutional Interpretation (Blackwell, Cambridge, 1991) 9-30, with Harris (n 9) 
114-63. 
20 Cover (n 7) 5. 
21 See M Minow, ‘Interpreting Rights: An Essay for Robert Cover’ (1987) Yale Law Journal 1860, 1861-62. 
22 See Cover (n 7) 9. 
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constructions of reality and to our visions of what the world might be’.23  Departing the 
distinction between ‘is’ and ‘ought’ embedded in varieties of legal theory, Cover thus argued 
that ‘[t]o live in a legal world requires that one integrate the “is”, the “ought”, and the “what 
might be”’.24  It is narratives that integrate these domains. 
To see the integrative role of narratives in building a nomos more clearly, a closer look 
at the relationship between interpretation and the meaning in law in Cover’s theory will help.  
Building on the idea of commitment, Cover located ‘[t]he transformation of interpretation into 
legal meaning’ in the moment ‘when someone accepts the demands of interpretation and, 
through the personal act of commitment, affirms the position taken’.25  This is more than 
consent to or acceptance of a particular rendering of the legal text.  Rather, ‘[s]uch affirmation 
entails a [unique] commitment to projecting the understanding of the norm at work in our 
reality through all possible worlds unto the teleological vision that the interpretation implies’.26  
Seen in this light, the creation of legal meaning also requires ‘the objectification of that to 
which one is committed’ as the legal interpretation rendered and its meaning become that 
which those inhabiting the political community will live by.27  To engender the objectification 
of the norms to which one is committed requires ‘a story of how law…came to be, and more 
importantly, how it came to be one’s own’, i.e., a narrative in which other members of the 
community can also find themselves.28  This commitment-underpinned interpretation reflects 
                                                 
23 See ibid 10. 
24 Ibid. 
25 Ibid 45 (emphasis added).   
26 Ibid. 
27 Ibid. 
28 ibid. 
 9 
Cover’s radical view of ‘law in action’,29 setting his conception of law as a normative world 
in which the law-interpreters also live the law they recreate in their own interpretation apart 
from those grounded only in legal analysis or moral philosophy.30 
Cover’s prototype of law as a nomos and how narratives mediate the tension between 
reality and vision is the norms of insular ‘paideic’ communities in which ‘[d]iscourse is 
initiatory, celebratory, expressive, and performative, rather than critical and analytic’.31 To 
put it in another way, in such close-knit communities, discourses and behaviours are 
intertwined so much so that the members effectively live out what the community law 
prescribes while remaking it through their discourses and behaviours. 32   Notably, the 
juirsgenerative process in Cover’s ideal ‘nomian’ communities is characterized by its radical 
instability.33  More important, a nomian community may attempt to remake the whole world 
on the model of its own nomos.  This is what Cover called ‘redemptive constitutionalism’.34  
I hasten to add that Cover did not suggest that constitutional redemption would rely on insular 
communities turning redemptionist.  Instead, Cover was concerned about the realization of 
redemptive constitutionalism in the conflicted world of legal pluralism.35  With ‘the fecundity 
                                                 
29 Aviam Soifer, ‘Covered Bridges’ (2005) 17 Yale Journal of Law and the Humanities 55, 62-63. 
30 J Resnik, ‘Living Their Legal Communities: Paideic Communities, Courts, and Robert Cover’ (2005) 17 
Yale Journal of Law and the Humanities 17, 27-29.  Cf P Brooks, ‘Narrative Transactions—Does Law Need a 
Narratology?’ (2006) 18 Yale Journal of Law & the Humanities 1.  For a critique of Cover’s legal theory from 
the perspective of analytical philosophy, see T Brooks, ‘Let a Thousand Nomoi Bloom? Four Problems with 
Robert Cover’s Nomos and Narrative’ [2006] Issus in Legal Scholarship (Article 5). 
31 Cover (n 7) 13. 
32 See Post (n 8) 10; Resnik (n 30) 27-28. 
33 See Cover (n 7) 12-35.  Cover noted that paideic communities tend to be insular as they maintain their 
legal meaning by expelling the destablizers of the normative order.  Ibid 15-16.  Robert Post argues that all 
nomoi are jurispathic for the exclusionary character of paideic communities.  Post (n 8) 13-14. 
34 Cover (n 7) 33. 
35 See ibid 13.  See also PS Berman, Global Legal Pluralism: A Jurisprudence of Law Beyond Borders 
(Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2012) 306-07. 
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of the jurisgenerative principle’ prompting ‘the need to maintain a sense of legal meaning’ and 
no nomos prevailing over another due to ‘the absence of a single, objective interpretation’, 
Cover noted, the agency of the state law (including the court) often claims to secure legal 
meaning ‘[b]y exercising its superior brute force’.36  To be clear, this does not mean that the 
modern legal world sustains itself only by force.  Instead, Cover observed that the state 
appeals to certain ‘virtues’ and some ‘mode of world maintenance’ in response to ‘the problem 
of the multiplicity of meaning’ in our modern legal world.37  Yet the virtues and the mode of 
world maintenance that are put forward in the judicial discourse to sustain our modern legal 
world are inclined towards objectivity and universalism.  Cover contended that appealing to 
this ‘imperial’ pattern of nomos formation, the state law ceases to be a self-reflexive ‘world-
creating’ project but instead turns into a ‘world-maintaining’ instrument. 38   This is the 
underlying cause of the jurispathy of the state law.39   
Contemplating the way out of the legal jurispathy of the modern state, Cover turned to 
commitment again.  Facing the jurispathic state legal order, Cover suggested, citizens have 
two options.  Either they resign themselves to the state or they act to remake the existing 
constitutional order on the model of their ideal nomos.40  To live by one’s own law means 
opting for the second path, taking the course of redemption.  To make it into a jurisgenesis, 
                                                 
36 See Cover (n 7) 40-44. 
37 Ibid 16. 
38 Ibid 12-13. 
39 Post (n 8) 11-13. 
40 To change the existing legal order requires a ‘movement of law’, which Cover considered to be redemptive 
and distinguished from a simple movement of protest.  To explain this distinction, Cover revisited the antebellum 
debate between Garrisonians and Frederick Douglass about the relationship between the US constitution and 
slavery.  See Cover (n 7) 35-39.  For the present purposes, I leave out the possibility of living with the state by 
simple protest.    
 11 
Cover pointed out, the redemptionists have to develop a ‘text of resistance’ through which the 
injustice they have suffered under the existing legal order and the new constitutional nomos 
they aspire to can be related to their fellow citizens.41  As part of the redemptive movement 
to change the existing legal order into a particular nomos, the text of resistance needs to be 
expressed and further interpreted in a way that can persuade other citizens, including through 
the redemptionists’ sufferings, if necessary.  Otherwise, the aspired constitutional order 
would be tantamount to another system of juridical violence.42  Thus, it is civil disobedience, 
not democratic deliberation, that Cover turned to for the exemplary jurisgenerative act.43  To 
Cover, obligation and responsibility rather than rights occupy centre stage in nomos-building44 
and commitment is the key to the success of the ‘secondary hermeneutic’ of the nomos-building 
narratives, ie, the text of resistance, when the redemptionists struggle not only with the state 
law but also among themselves in the face of legal pluralism.45   
Yet, Cover did not hold high hopes for official redemption through commitment in the 
bureaucratic administration of the inherently violent state legal order.46  Take the judge, the 
preeminent interpreter of the state law.  Interpreting the law or adjudicating a case, ‘the judge 
– armed with no inherently superior interpretive insight, no necessarily better law – must 
                                                 
41 See ibid 49-50. 
42 Cover suggested that not only the state but also communities and movements are the object of legitimization 
through constitutionalism.  See ibid 68.  On this view, ‘[l]egal meaning becomes a “potential restraint on [any] 
arbitrary power and violence”’.  Ibid.   
43 Resnik (n 30) 32-33; see also Post (n 8) 14-15. 
44 Soifer (n 29) 67-68. 
45 See Cover (n 7) 50-53.  This point distinguishes Cover’s view from the so-called ‘unsettlement theorists’, 
who attribute the legitimacy of a constitution to its reflection of the preferred policy positions of individual 
citizens.  See LM Seidman, Our Unsettled Constitution: A New Defense of Constitutionalism and Judicial 
Review (Yale University Press, New Haven, CT, 2001).  
46 Compare Post (n 8), with A Sarat, ‘Robert Cover on Law and Violence’ in M Minow et al (eds) (n 11) 
255, 260-61. 
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separate the exercise of [legal] violence from [her] own person’ by attributing her decision and 
the accompanying force to the impartial function of the law.47  To this end, Cover observed, 
the judge appeals to what he called ‘texts of jurisdiction’ to dissociate herself from the violence 
of the state legal order she is mandated to administer.48  Yet, more often than not, appealing 
to jurisdictional rules results in ‘[judicial] deference to the authoritarian application of 
violence’.49  
Even if the judge is personally open to the extra-state constitutional visions, she may well 
fail to help with the jurisgenerative process of reconstructing constitutional meaning and 
reimagining the constitutional nomos.  In the face of the conflicting constitutional visions 
submitted by distinct civil sectors, the state agency’s acceptance of one vision rather than 
another will not indicate a jurisgenerative substitution of padeic norms for the jurispathic state 
law.  Rather, the court’s choice may risk the suggestion that the state is taking sides in the 
uncertain struggle over constitutional visions among the civil sectors.  This explains why the 
court tends to decline the conflicting invitations from the civil sectors to adopt any of their 
renderings of constitutional principles and to seek refuge in the seemingly neutral rules of 
jurisdiction.50  Yet, escaping from the articulation of constitutional principles to the exegesis 
of jurisdictional rules, the court also disengages itself from the jurisgenerative process.  Taken 
together, Cover concluded, ‘[c]ourts…are characteristically “jurispathic”’.51  In this light, the 
                                                 
47 Cover (n 7) 54. 
48 Notably, Cover included not only the technical rules governing the jurisdiction of courts but also the general 
legal grounds of the judicial power in the texts of jurisdiction.  See ibid. 
49 Ibid 56. 
50 Resnik (n 30) 34.  Cover discussed the tendency towards a positivist invocation of the text of jurisdiction 
to avoid the risky natural law alternative.  See Cover (n 7) 58-60. 
51 Ibid 40. 
 13 
legal world centring on judicial review as legal constitutionalism envisages is far from a nomos 
but instead a juridical order of institutionalized force devoid of meaning. 
B. Constitutional Politics and Nomos-Building: A Jurisgenerative Case 
for Political Constitutionalism? 
I noted above that Cover characterized judicial review as jurispathic for either it imposes 
the violence-backed official rendering of constitutional principles on the political community 
or it takes itself out of the jurisgenerative process by dodging constitutional issues under the 
pretext of jurisdictional rules.  Given the growing influence of the constitution on everyday 
politics,52  Cover’s scepticism about judicial review seems to echo the plea for ‘political 
constitution’ made by John Griffith: ‘political questions of much day-to-day significance’ 
should not be ‘left to decision by the judiciary’.53   
Political constitutionalism and Cover’s ideal legal world as a nomos converge on a crucial 
point: both emphasize the role of the extrajudicial processes in the functioning of constitutional 
orders.  To Cover, judicial review stops the continuing jurisgenerative process in which 
members of a political community find their place in the (re)generation of the meaning of the 
constitution; to political constitutionalists, the court simply ‘fobs off’ attempts to resolve 
significant political issues through deliberation in democratic societies. 54   Moreover, 
questioning the final say the court claims to have over constitutional issues, both take conflict 
as the key to understanding the meaning of the constitution.  Cover attributed the tragic 
                                                 
52 See M-S Kuo, ‘Reconciling Constitutionalism with Power: Towards a Constitutional Nomos of Political 
Ordering’ (2010) 23 Ratio Juris 390, 391-94. 
53 JAG Griffith, ‘The Political Constitution’ (1979) 42 Modern Law Review 1, 14. 
54 See ibid.  
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jurispathic character of judicial review to conflicting visions in pluralist societies and pinned 
hopes for constitutional jurisgenesis on narratives that originate in norm contestation beyond 
the judicial process; political constitutionalists entrust political institutions, the parliament in 
particular, with the resolution of fundamental conflicts in the face of value pluralism.55 
Beyond their shared scepticism about judicial review, however, there is a key difference.  
To Cover, it is ‘extrastate jurisgenesis’ that generates and rejuvenates the meaning of the 
constitution; 56  to political constitutionalists, what matters is the arguments and reform 
attempts that are proposed, debated, negotiated, and decided by political institutions.  To put 
it bluntly, Cover focused on the making of constitutional narratives that would bring about 
commitment in interpretation, whereas political constitutionalism suggests the pivotal role of 
the political institutions vis-à-vis the court in giving meaning to the constitution.  Cover’s 
deep scepticism about the jurispathic court is part of his fundamental distrust of the state 
power.57  If my characterization is correct, through Cover’s lens, political constitutionalism 
seems to be no less jurispathic than legal constitutionalism as it still ties the meaning of the 
constitution to its official rendering.  This raises a fundamental question to political 
constitutionalists: If at the heart of constitutionalism is not just the question of which institution 
(or department) of constitutional power should have the final say, what is it that really 
distinguishes political from legal constitutionalism?  Cover’s reflections upon how the court 
could be made less jurispathic provide some hints about the answer. 
                                                 
55 See ibid 18-20. 
56 Cover (n 7) 53. 
57 Post (n 8). 
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Acknowledging the jurispathic character of the court, Cover still entertained hopes for 
the state law being interpreted in a way conducive, at least partially, to jurisgenesis. 58  
Rejecting the legal positivism that has guided the technical invocation of the text of 
jurisdiction, Cover urged the judge to embrace what he called a ‘natural law of jurisdiction’.59  
As discussed above, Cover understood the text of jurisdiction in a broader sense.60  From this 
broader view of jurisdiction, Cover pinned hopes for a possible judicial redemption on a 
nonpositivist engagement with the general grounds of the judicial power when the judge 
interprets the law.61  The judge is not personally innocent when she is faced with a conflict 
between the state law and the non-state norms.  Instead, she can only commit herself to the 
law she is interpreting by disclosing its violent nature.62  Thus, the judge is expected to 
elaborate on ‘the institutional privilege of force’ trusted with her when she faces a conflict 
between the state and the civil visions of constitutional principles.63  Unlike the positivist and 
technical employment of jurisdictional rules, Cover argued, dwelling on the structure of the 
jurisdiction in this situation is not aimed at conveniently disengaging the judge from the 
jurisgenerative process.  Nor is it an instance of deference to the political departments.64  
Rather, it opens the judicial exercise of state violence to the process of justification and shows 
                                                 
58 Resnik (n 30) 33-35; Sarat (n 46) 261.  But see Post (n 8).  Cover was drawn to an even more pessimistic 
stance on judicial interpretation in his later work.  See RM Cover, ‘Violence and the Word’ (1986) 95 Yale Law 
Journal 1601; RM Cover, ‘The Bonds of Constitutional Interpretation: Of the Word, the Deed and the Role’ 
(1986) 20 Georgia Law Review 815. 
59 Cover (n 7) 58. 
60 See n 48. 
61 Notably, Cover’s hope for such redemption was not high in terms of the bureaucratic/ managerial propensity 
of judges: ‘[judges] are [accustomed] to casting their cautious eyes about, ferreting out jurisdictional excuses to 
avoid disrupting the orderly deployment of state power and privilege’.  Cover (n 7) 67. 
62 Resnik (n 8) 34-35; Sarat (n 44) 261. 
63 See Cover (n 7) 54. 
64 See ibid 56-57. 
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the judge’s personal commitment in the act of interpretation.  The judge’s judgment cannot 
hide behind the threat of state violence but has to base itself on the narratives underpinning the 
legitimacy of judicial power.  The objective of a nonpositivist rendering of the text of 
jurisdiction is to ground the court’s authority in the judge’s bringing forth the constitutional 
vision and its underlying principles.  To Cover, ‘[i]n a truly violent, authoritarian situation, 
nothing is more revolutionary than the insistence of a judge that [she] exercise such a 
‘jurisdiction’ – but only if that jurisdiction implies the articulation of legal principle according 
to an independent hermeneutic’.65   Under this natural law of jurisdiction, ‘the employment 
of [legal] force is not revealed as a naked jurispathic act’.66  Instead, the ‘texts of jurisdiction’ 
become the judge’s ‘apologies for the state [violence] itself’.67  At the end of the day, ‘[t]he 
commitment to a jurisgenerative process that does not defer to the violence of administration 
is the judge’s only hope of partially extricating [herself] from the violence of the state’.68     
Cover’s subtle critique of the US Supreme Court’s implicit repudiation of the racist 
disciplinary rules of Bob Jones University illustrates how narratives can render judicial 
decisions less jurispathic and, moreover, what a non-court-centred, political version of 
constitutionalism is really about.  In Bob Jones University v United States,69 the Supreme 
Court (hereinafter the Court) upheld a US Internal Revenue Service (IRS) ruling that denied a 
non-denominational Protestant Bob Jones University the tax-exempt status that had been 
granted to certain charitable religious and educational institutions (including Bob Jones 
                                                 
65 Ibid 59. 
66 Ibid 54. 
67 Ibid.  
68 Ibid 59 (emphasis added). 
69 461 US 574 (1983). 
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University) for its ban on interracial dating and marriage among its students.  The 
constitutional claim of religious freedom and autonomy made by the appellant and supported 
by several religious groups as amici curiae failed to persuade the Court to rescind the IRS 
official rendering of the federal tax regulation concerned. 70   The Court ruled the IRS’ 
reinterpretation of the tax law as a lawful exercise of administrative discretion in the pursuit of 
the compelling government interest in eradicating racial discrimination.  This seems to be a 
straightforward case: Religious freedom bowed to racial equality.   
That would be true if the focus was only on the outcome: The Court contributed to the 
further desegregation of American society by affirming the message sent by the IRS ruling to 
the effect that a racist institution should find no place in the US constitutional order, including 
the tax-exempt status in the tax code.71  This deserved a resounding applause.  Yet the basis 
on which the judgement rested, administrative discretion, troubled Cover.  What Cover 
observed of the decision was that in the Court’s eye, the eradication of racial discrimination 
was merely a function of government discretion instead of constitutional commitment.  The 
Court seemed to suggest that under the constitution, the IRS was not obliged to replace the old 
interpretation that had granted the appellant the tax-exempt status with the impugned new 
ruling.  To Cover, the Court’s emphasis on administrative policy and government interest 
without paying equal heed to religious freedom concerns was nothing short of a naked 
invocation of imperial virtues, rendering Bob Jones University utterly jurispathic.  The 
                                                 
70 See O Johnson, ‘The Story of Bob Jones University v. United States: Race, Religion, and Congress’ 
Extraordinary Acquiescence’ in WN Eskridge et al (eds), Statutory Interpretation Stories (Foundation Press, New 
York, NY, 2010) 126. 
71 See ibid. 
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Court’s failure to situate the decision in the redemptive narrative of America as a nation 
struggling to rid herself of slavery and racial discrimination indicated the Court’s lack of 
commitment to the nomos of equal protection.  As a result, eradicating racial discrimination 
was reduced to one of the many government interests with its constitutional meaning being left 
out.  Moreover, disconnecting the issue from the value conflict between equal protection and 
religious freedom, the Court gave short shrift to the nomoi of distinct amici curiae that had 
reflected a long history of fighting against the political persecution of religious groups.72  
Religious freedom was thus not sacrificed for the equally important redemption of the 
constitutional promise of equal protection but was rather easily set aside in the pursuit of a 
compelling government interest. 
What is of significance in Cover’s critique of Bob Jones University is not how the court 
can make its judgment less jurispathic in individual cases but his envisaged jurisgenerative 
constitutional politics, which is oriented towards nomos-building.  Specifically, the court, 
through its judgment and the underlying reasoning, also contributes to the constantly 
rejuvenated, broader constitutional narratives that give meaning to the constitution.  The 
judicial decision may affirm, rewrite, or take forward the continuing constitutional narratives, 
which have shaped up in the broader constitutional politics of conflicting constitutional 
principles involving the administration, the legislature, the religious groups, the trade unions, 
and all citizens.  This narrative-shaping politics is the underpinning of constitutional 
jurisgenesis.  Situated in this jurisgenerative process of norm contestation, the exercise of 
                                                 
72 See Cover (n 7) 66-67.  Judith Resnik disagrees with Cover and argues that Bob Jones University is not 
jurispathic for its failure to recognize religious freedom.  Resnik (n 30) 40-43. 
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judicial power can be made less jurispathic. 
Thus, the way to (partial) redemption for an inherently juristpahic agency of the state lies 
in the recognition of its non-privileged status in the jurisgenerative process of redefining the 
constitution.  Seen in this light, the court is no more than an impactful player in constitutional 
politics.  So is the parliament.  The parliament would be even more jurispathic than the court 
in the eyes of the public if it is seen to be indifferent to the jurisgenerative process.  In other 
words, a robust version of non-court-centred constitutionalism needs to be situated in a new 
understanding of constitutional politics, which political constitutionalists have failed to 
conceive. 
III. REALIGNING POLITICS WITH CONSTITUTIONAL 
JURISGENESIS: LESSONS FROM ‘NOMOS AND NARRATIVE’ 
With the focus shifting from the question of which constitutional power is a more suitable 
decision-maker to the role of constitutional politics in the alternative robust non-court-centred 
version of political constitutionalism, reconceiving the place of politics in the constitutional 
order is necessary to make the constitutional order itself jurisgenerative.  For this we have a 
lot to learn from ‘Nomos and Narrative’.  Yet some issues about Cover’s stance should be 
addressed in the first place.  Cover’s theory was built around the cases concerning 
fundamental rights as he was most concerned about the conflict between the state and the civil 
sectors.  It seems that Cover would not have much to say about what a constitutional order 
should look like when the concern moves beyond the relationship between the government and 
individuals.  Besides, Cover’s jurisgenerative view of the constitution was set against the US 
constitutional background of popular sovereignty and drew heavily on Jewish sources, giving 
little hint as to the generation of the nomos-underlying narratives.  It is not clear whether 
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Cover’s theory could shed new light on the broader issues surrounding a robust version of non-
court-centred political constitutionalism in modern democracies.  Moreover, Cover’s idea of 
jurisgenerative politics seems to place him in the camp of contemporary deliberative 
democracy theorists, contradicting his emphasis on the role of narratives in building a nomos. 
These are all fair questions and I am not sure of how Cover would have replied.  Still, 
in my view, Cover could offer insight on the issues beyond his immediate concern, especially 
current understanding of jurisgenerative politics.  At the heart of Cover’s concern is the 
jurispathic nature of the state legal system and the violence it falls back on.  True, the 
relationship between the government and individuals directly implicates the exercise of the 
state power.  Yet beneath the surface of the constitutional issues concerning fundamental 
rights lies the question of whether these issues should be resolved through the political process 
or by adjudication. 73   To answer this question needs to consider how the constitution 
conceives the relationship between the political departments (especially the legislature) and 
the court.  Moreover, the issues as to how the government is organized and constitutional 
powers are allocated have a great bearing on the operation of the legal order under which the 
people live.74  Thus, in my view, Cover would not object that his theory not only concerns 
the government vs individuals issues but also bears on the relationship between the political 
departments and the court and their roles in constitutional politics.   
With respect to Cover’s theoretical roots in the US experience, what matters is that the 
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idea of democracy has travelled beyond American soil and emerged as the rallying call for 
political movements of various causes, regardless of whether popular sovereignty intimates 
another American exceptionalism.75  I think that Cover would agree that given constitutional 
democracy’s embattled condition in the face of populist challenges,76 it is more important than 
ever to look into the politics of constitutional narratives by means of which the constitutional 
order can be constantly reimagined and thus reconnected to the people.77 
As noted in Introduction, Cover’s aspired nomos and jurisgenesis seem to correspond to 
the idea of jurisgenerative politics around which theorists of deliberative democracy such as 
Michelman, Habermas, and Benhabib have rallied.  Drawing upon Hannah Arendt’s 
attribution of power to plurality and natality, all the three theorists try to answer the question 
of how the law is (re)generated through the interaction between citizens.78  To that extent, 
they share Cover’s scepticism about the official rendering of legal precepts in the hands of the 
state apparatus.  Yet, Cover held much deeper distrust of the state than those who approach 
this issue from the perspective of deliberative democracy. 79   To them, dialogue through 
inclusive procedures is central to jurisgenerative politics, indicating their predilection for 
proceduralism.  Moreover, jurisgenerative politics can be institutionalized and channelled 
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through the state, especially the court.80  In contrast to deliberative democrats’ public reason-
guided understanding, jurisgenerative politics envisaged by Cover is more contentious and 
even confrontational as the focus is on the substance of the norms in conflict.  Jurisgenesis 
cannot be unencumbered by conflicts of substantive values.81  Differentiation of the foregoing 
two versions of jurisgenerative politics is pivotal to understanding the implications of Cover’s 
‘Nomos and Narrative’ to constitutional politics and the role of narratives in his envisaged 
jurisgenerative politics.  
Viewed thus, Cover’s deep scepticism of the jurispathic character of the state legal order 
and his passionate aspirations for transforming the constitutional order into a nomos through 
the contestation of competing narratives sets his concept of jurisgenesis apart from the 
dialogical understanding of jurisgenerative politics, suggesting that the order-changing 
jurisgenerative process not centre on institutionalized politics but rather originate in the flow 
of constitutional narratives where an inclusive constitutional politics takes place.  In this light, 
I take two lessons from ‘Nomos and Narrative’: One is at the macro level; the other at the 
micro.  At the macro level, I take up the role of the idea of institutional sovereignty82 in the 
constitutional debate and suggest that constitutional politics be freed of the fetters of 
institutional sovereignty.  Besides, to engage the people in constitutional politics, we need to 
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follow up with rethinking how the constitution relates itself to them.  The necessary move 
from the fiction of popular sovereignty to constitutional narratives oriented towards nomos-
building lies at the centre of my microscopic take on constitutional politics in light of Cover’s 
jurisgenesis. 
A. Lesson One: Dethrone Institutional Sovereigns 
In Introduction, I noted that the continuing spread of judicial review among jurisdictions 
of different constitutional traditions has reinvigorated the debate about the relationship 
between law and politics in constitutional theory.  Whether judicial review should adopt the 
‘strong’ or the ‘weak’ form is one of the most featured themes in this debate.83  In this section, 
I compare the UK and the US to illustrate how Cover’s theory could cast new light on the 
debate surrounding the judicial power.  I choose these two examples for two reasons.  First, 
as far as the role of the judicial power in the constitutional order is concerned, the constitutional 
debate in both countries tend to be framed as the question of whether politics or law should 
take the lead in constitutional development.  Echoing the political vs legal constitutionalism 
debate in the UK, the constitutional debate in the US has been in a protracted tug of war 
between judicial supremacists and constitutional departmentalists.84  Second, the UK and the 
US stand in stark contrast in terms of constitutional traditions: the one is noted for its 
evolutionary character and rooted in parliamentary sovereignty; 85  the other builds on a 
revolutionary tradition under the watch of a powerful high court.86  Thus, a comparison of 
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these two examples helps to illustrate the broad implications of Cover’s theory to the role of 
judicial power vis-à-vis the political branch and the role of institutional power in constitutional 
order in general.  
I argue that the debate in the UK and the US has adopted a narrow view of politics 
underpinned by the idea of institutional sovereignty and has thus centred on the question of 
whether the parliament or the court should have the final say over constitutional questions.  
Under this view is a misconceived relationship between law and politics.  Learning from 
Cover, I suggest an alternative understanding of politics in the constitutional order.  Denying 
the formal institutions the sovereign status on constitutional questions87 and placing them 
among other players in the broad constitutional politics will pave the way for a meaning-rich 
constitutional jurisgenesis. 
1. Parliamentary Sovereignty on Trial: Political Constitutionalism Is Not 
Necessarily Jurisgenerative 
I have already noted that in light of ‘Nomos and Narrative,’ political constitutionalism 
as portrayed in current scholarship is jurispathic.  Now I am taking a closer look at the British 
constitutional arrangement in which political constitutionalism is situated to see how the 
relationship between law and politics plays out in it and how the idea of constitutional 
jurisgenesis can cast new light on that relationship.  In the British context, the traditional 
focus of the relationship between law and politics is on how to effectively hold the executive 
                                                 
expand further on this juxtaposition when I address the relationship between democracy and the idea of popular 
sovereignty in the text accompanied by notes 159-67. 
87 For an insightful comparison of the individual-centred and the community-based attitude towards the 
‘deinstitutionalization of authority’, see S Levinson, Constitutional Faith (Princeton University Press, 
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to account: Does politics or the judicial means provide better antidotes to the abuse of power 
by the government?88  Among the many issues deriving from this central concern is the role 
of the court vis-à-vis the political departments in decision-making.  Doctrinally, this issue lies 
at the heart of whether and, if so, to what extent courts are expected to reconsider the exercise 
of statutory discretion by the administration under the traditional Wednesbury 89 
unreasonableness test or the adopted continental proportionality review. 90   While this 
doctrinal question appears to concern the judicial and executive powers only, it plays out in 
the shadow of the legislative power as the disputed discretionary power of the executive is 
delegated by (parliamentary) legislation. 91   Moreover, with the HRA subjecting both 
administrative acts and parliamentary legislation to judicial scrutiny, this debate is even more 
heated. 92   Against this backdrop, some political constitutionalists attempt to make a 
normative case against the trend towards legal constitutionalism in the UK in terms of the role 
of the parliament and the court in making decisions of constitutional significance.93   
The core of the case against legal constitutionalism is that the parliamentary process is 
more suitable to resolve fundamental policy issues than the judicial proceeding in the present 
pluralist society.  Richard Bellamy argues that all theories in support of legal 
constitutionalism characterised by judicial review are premised on the existence and 
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discoverability of the correct constitutional answer to current fundamental policy issues.94  He 
contends that fundamental policy issues, on which the bill of rights in the constitution has much 
bearing, are political, not legal, in nature, requiring political solutions.95  In line with this 
political version of the constitution, Adam Tomkins further argues that the parliament is better 
at proportionality (or the Wednesbury reasonableness for that matter) reasoning than the court.  
At the core of the proportionality analysis in judicial decisions is the political consideration 
and balancing of different constitutional goods.  Thus, the parliamentary balancing of 
competing constitutional goods deserves ‘constitutionally appropriate respect’ from the 
court.96  From the perspective of political constitutionalism, the meaning of the constitution 
materializes through the parliamentary process under the watch of the electorate.  And, that 
is how the constitutional order functions.  Thus, a US-style strong-form rights-based judicial 
review would upend the relationship between the parliament and the court.97   
Notably, in reaching this conclusion, political constitutionalists make three fundamental 
assumptions.98  First, the electorate is the final arbiter of constitutional issues and only the 
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parliament finds direct connection with the electorate through election. 99   Second, 
institutionalized politics is privileged over social movements and other forms of citizen 
mobilization.  Attempts to resolve fundamental issues outside the institutional channels of 
democratic politics are ‘anti-political’.100  Third, political change is, more often than not, 
evolutionary: all day-to-day politics has constitutional implications; constitutional politics 
takes place in the run-of-the-mill political activities.  What Bruce Ackerman calls ‘higher 
lawmaking’ is revolutionaries’ romantic dream not shared by political constitutionalists.101   
I have no intention to take on these assumptions one by one in the present paper.  Rather, 
I wish to lay bare an ‘infelicity’ implicit in the first assumption, which would cast doubt on the 
version of political constitutionalism as described above.  From the democratic perspective, 
it is true that the electorate should be the final arbiter of constitutional issues.  It is equally 
true that election is central to the link between the electorate and the parliament.102  But it is 
not clear why election has to be the only means for the electorate to have their voice heard in 
decision-making if the electorate means not only the voters casting their ballots on the election 
day but also the citizens who are able to take other political actions than voting.  For example, 
citizens can petition their parliamentarians in the interval between elections to decide an issue 
in a certain way.103  Moreover, if such petitions are considered one of the legitimate means 
connecting citizens (or the electorate) to policy decisions, it is hard to see why they cannot 
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direct their petitions to other decision-making bodies through other means.  Litigation is an 
example.104   
Political constitutionalists may counter that petitioning to the parliament is an integral 
part of electoral democracy, which distinguishes legislative petition from judicial litigation.  
Even so, it remains unclear why the parliament-centred process of electoral democracy should 
be granted the status as the privileged channel of politics at the expense of other forms of 
political action.  As social scientists have long documented, wealth, education, ethnicity, race, 
culture, and other factors bear greatly on participation in electoral democracy, including the 
constituents’ connection to their local parliamentarians.105  A constitutional theory in which 
the parliament-centred political process is conceived as pre-empting other channels of political 
mobilization fails to consider the latter’s compensatory role in political participation for the de 
facto disenfranchised population.106   
I hasten to add that what I have just stated does not suggest that litigation or other sorts 
of political participation displace election from the centre of democratic politics.  Rather, my 
point is that election should not be viewed as the exclusive means whereby citizens find 
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connection to politics to the extent that other forms of political participation are regarded as 
anti-political.  Rather, they jointly put the idea of democracy into action.107  Thinking further 
down the line, I doubt that social movement is anti-political as political constitutionalists seems 
to suggest, especially when it functions as the compensation for institutionalized political 
decision-making.108  Coming to terms with the political character of social movement, we 
then see why some political decisions that are taken during the moments of highly mobilized 
citizen participation need to be distinguished from those pushed through amid unnoticed 
political bargains.109  Or, we can simply ask, should we give equal weight of democracy to 
all political decisions and allow them to be easily disregarded through political bargains?  
From the perspective of normative democratic theory, it demands a resounding ‘No’ for the 
answer.110 
If so, a hierarchy of legal norms emerges.111  On the conceptual level, the constitution, 
which supposedly enjoys general support beyond the simple majority of the citizenry, is to be 
distinguished from the rest.112  Normatively the constitution is not subject to the run-of-the-
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mill politics and thus functions as the higher law.  It should be noted that the practical 
implications of treating the constitution as the higher law turn on institutional design as well 
as legal tradition.  Not all the jurisdictions that subscribe to the idea of higher law embrace a 
US-style judicial review.113  Nor does the entrenchment of the constitution necessarily result 
in an inflexible constitutional order that will be out of sync with a changing society.114  Even 
so, political constitutionalists resist the idea of the constitution as the higher law.  Being a 
noted defender of political constitutionalism, for example, Bellamy takes no issue with HRA’s 
content but maintains that ‘there can be no higher, rights-based constitutional law that sits 
above or beyond politics’.115  What intrigues me is Bellamy’s characterization of a higher-
law-style constitution as sitting above or beyond politics.  Regardless of the different theories 
of higher law, I have noted above that the constitution as the higher law can be the result of 
politics.  To be sure, it is not the same species of politics as Bellamy has in mind.  Yet such 
a parliament-centred exclusionary view of politics is fundamental to him and other political 
constitutionalists.  If another kind of politics can be imagined differently from that which 
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centres on the parliamentary process, there will be no reason to subject the constitution 
resulting from the former to the latter.  Cutting loose from the political constitutionalist 
exclusionary view of politics, the contention that the parliament functions as the only political 
channel of democracy does not hold.   
Now we can see why political constitutionalists can embrace HRA while rejecting rights-
based constitutional law as higher law.  They are pleased with the judicial scrutiny of 
government acts including the parliamentary legislation through the interpretation of the rights 
incorporated in HRA as long as its result remains subject to the parliament’s final decision.116  
Corresponding to this stance, political constitutionalists insist that HRA’s very existence too 
has to be subject to parliamentary politics as they conceive of no politics above or beyond the 
parliament.117  Taken together, underlying political constitutionalism is the belief that all 
politics takes place around the parliament as the ultimate decision-making institution.  Simply 
put, the parliament is sovereign. 
The dissection of the British variety of political constitutionalism reveals that it amounts 
to an empirical justification of the doctrine of parliamentary sovereignty under the assumption 
that politics is confined to formal institutions and the decision of the parliament is the 
culmination of the political process. 118   This reflects what I have called the concept of 
institutional sovereignty. 119   Yet the assumption of institutional sovereignty also makes 
political constitutionalism as jurispathic as the court-centred, legal constitutionalism since the 
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parliament sits above the jurisgenerative process in which the extrastate sectors partake.      
Nothing I have said suggests that the court should stand above the parliament as legal 
constitutionalism intimates.  Otherwise, it would only be another manifestation of the concept 
of institutional sovereignty. 120   But it does invite us to rethink politics in a way that 
parliamentary sovereignty could be recast in a more robust non-court-centred political version 
of constitutionalism than political constitutionalists have entertained.  Here comes in Cover’s 
idea of constitutional jurisgenesis.  Constitutional politics should be understood more broadly 
than political constitutionalism contends.  It takes place where the meaning of the 
constitutional order is contested, debated, and rejuvenated beyond the Westminster.  On this 
view, to make election the pivot of the connection between citizens and political decisions, 
what happens in the interval between elections should not be disparaged as anti-political.  
Rather, social movement and other forms of citizen mobilization are the lead-up to election.  
Only when the parliament continues to heed to the civil voices and narratives made in the 
media of essays, editorials, speeches, and other discursive forms and to answer the calls from 
citizens in making its decisions does it figure as ‘the mirror of the nation’.121  It is on this 
condition that parliamentary decisions deserve the respect from the court, or rather the people.  
Once the parliament fails the above condition, its decisions are jurispathic and citizens will 
thus find alternative channels, institutionalized or not, to make sure that their voices be heard, 
taking constitutional politics beyond the legislative chamber to the courtrooms and further to 
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the streets if necessary.  Seen in this light, both the parliament and the court are part of the 
broader politics in the jurisgenerative process of constitutional rejuvenation.  Neither the 
parliamentary legislation nor the court judgments are beyond the politics of norm contestation.  
It is in the contentious political process that the meaning of the constitution continues to evolve. 
Viewing the prominence of the British parliament this way bears greatly on the doctrine 
of parliamentary sovereignty.  Traditionally this constitutional doctrine suggests the British 
constitutional order as one of parliamentary government. 122   Yet, through the lens of 
constitutional jurisgenesis, we may see parliamentary sovereignty differently.  As many 
British political constitutionalists have noted, the parliament has lived up to occasion time and 
again, pushing through many progressive but controversial reforms.123  It is based on this 
record that the parliament has commanded deference from the court.  Seen in this light, the 
parliament figures as ‘the mirror of the nation’ not because of its preordained constitutional 
status as a sovereign parliament.  Instead, the parliament is admired only because of its ability 
to express ‘the mind of the [British] people’ and its role in forging national identity.124  The 
parliament is not some awe-inspiring sovereign that is entitled to deference.  It has to win 
respect.  In sum, no institution can make a claim to sovereignty in a robust version of non-
court-centred constitutionalism.  In light of Cover’s idea of constitutional jurisgenesis, the 
focus of political constitutionalism should be on the politics of norm contestation, which 
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involves not only institutions such as the parliament and the court but also the public. 
2. After Judicial Sovereignty? Rethinking Judicial Self-Restraint in Light 
of Constitutional Jurisgenesis 
Unlike the British constitutional order centring on parliamentary sovereignty, the US 
constitution is defined by separation of powers.  Through this comparatist lens, the core 
question of the relationship between law and politics in the US constitutional order is not 
whether the Court or congress is supreme but rather how to define their separate jurisdiction.125  
Since Chief Justice Marshall laid the foundation of modern judicial review in Marbury v 
Madison with the statement that ‘[i]t is emphatically the province and duty of the judicial 
department to say what the law is’,126 how to keep ‘acts [that] are only politically examinable’ 
outside the purview of judicial review has been at the heart of the distinction between law and 
politics.127  Yet what is characteristic of the development of the US constitution in its two-
century-long history has been its increasing judicialization. 128   The Court-mandated 
desegregation and its progressive jurisprudence on civil liberties and rights in the mid-
twentieth century is the culmination of the long tradition of translating social issues into 
constitutional questions in the US.129  With the constitution being treated more in line with 
law than with politics, judicial supremacy displaces separation of powers.130  Constitutional 
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supremacy turns into judicial supremacy.   
At its height the development of judicial supremacy also politicized the Court.  
Paralleling the political reactions to the Court’s progressive jurisprudence was scholarly 
concerns over the judicial usurpation of the constitutional powers allocated to the political 
departments. 131   Judicial self-restraint first emerged as the rallying cry for checking the 
activist Court.132  Notably, judicial self-restraint has since been a contested concept with 
different emphasis and implications.133  The common theme for the diverse opinions rallied 
around this concept is a plea to the Court to invalidate legislation only when its 
unconstitutionality is ‘so clear that it is not open to rational question’.134  This is the famous 
Thayerian origin of judicial self-restraint in the US constitutional theory: The counter-
majoritarian Court should show deference to the decisions taken by democratically elected 
legislatures in its exercise of judicial review.  Leaving aside the theoretical subtleties in its 
evolution, 135  judicial self-restraint was then considered not only an antidote to judicial 
activism but also a policy of judicial self-preservation amid the political rancour aroused by 
the Court’s progressive jurisprudence.  As embodied in Alex Bickel’s ‘passive virtues’, 
judicial self-restraint was advocated as part of judicial ethos that would be necessary to keep 
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the judicial power away from political vicissitudes so that the Court could concentrate its 
limited political capital on matters of ‘principle’.136 
It should be noted that among constitutional scholars the calls for judicial self-restraint 
have faded since its high in the 1980s, while the Court’s stance on judicial supremacy has 
firmed up even more.137  Judge Posner has attributed the fall of judicial self-restraint to the 
thriving of constitutional theories.  According to his observation, standing on a firm 
theoretical ground, judges have tended to approach constitutional issues from a comprehensive 
and systematic view.  As a result, they have been less inclined towards exercising the policy-
driven self-restraint and thus enhanced the role of the court in constitutional decisions.138 
Although the Court continues to interpret the constitution according to the ‘modalities of 
constitutional argument’,139 its growing influence has made it the institutional embodiment of 
popular sovereignty.140  Seen in this light, judicial supremacy is further transfigured into 
judicial sovereignty, if you will.141 
Yet it may be premature to write the obituary of judicial self-restraint.  On the one hand, 
it does not completely vanish from judicial practice as it has evolved from judges’ individual 
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virtue into the Court’s institutional strategy in specific types of litigation.142  On the other, in 
the guise of ‘minimalism’, the ethos of judicial self-restraint continues to function as a 
counterforce to judicial activism. 143   Moreover, a quick check on the recent highly 
contentious cases discloses that advocates of different political persuasions have made pleas 
for judicial self-restraint when the odds are against their position on substantive constitutional 
issues.144  Thus, the appeal of judicial self-restraint endures, despite the prevalence of judicial 
supremacy. 
I take no position on the theoretical subtleties of judicial self-restraint.  What interests 
me here is the underlying concern of judicial self-restraint: As the trend of judicialization 
deepens, the Court may pre-empt democratic changes by entrenching certain policy choices 
through its decisions.145  To put it differently, once the Court speaks, what it says will stay as 
part of the constitution, commanding consent and observance from the political departments 
and the public.  This is what the concept of judicial self-restraint presupposes and aims to roll 
back when it is invoked to avert the ossification of the constitutional order in the era of judicial 
supremacy.  Yet the presupposition that the political departments and the public will observe 
what the Court says is the mirror image of judicial sovereignty: The Court is the institutional 
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embodiment of popular sovereignty as the constitution becomes what the Court says it is.146 
Viewed thus, judicial self-restraint does not so much challenge judicial supremacy as 
implicitly endorses the idea of judicial sovereignty.  To begin with, it fails to give a coherent 
account of the appropriate scope of judicial review apart from appealing to the prudential 
judgment of individual judges or turning to the ambiguous idea of judicial minimalism.147  
Notably, given the constitution being treated as law vis-à-vis politics, its implementation is 
measured against ‘how the constitution would be expounded by judges’.148  Thus, in the eyes 
of the public, invoking the incoherent judicial self-restraint is tantamount to failing the judicial 
duty to enforce the Constitution.  This explains why judicial self-restraint has gradually gone 
out of fashion.149  More important, focusing on whether the Court should intervene and how 
deep or broad its intervention should be, judicial self-restraint pictures a curtailed image of 
constitutional law and politics.150  On this view, the interaction of law and politics only exists 
before the Court decides.  Once the decision is taken, the law speaks and all politics ends.  
This view of constitutional law only consolidates the role of the Court as the institutional holder 
of sovereignty.  In other words, both judicial self-restraint and judicial supremacy are 
premised on the concept of institutional sovereignty, converging on a court-centred view of 
constitutional law.151  The constitution is equated with judicial decisions whose depth and 
breadth are a function of judicial ethos.  The legal profession becomes the agent of the 
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constitution by virtue of expertise (legal argument) and ethos (self-restraint or activism).  
Under this view, there is no place for constitutional politics outside the court.  In the final 
analysis, avocates of judicial self-restraint and their progeny are concerned with how to keep 
politics away from the Court. 152   What emanates from this Court-centred view of 
constitutional law is constitutional jurispathy, inadvertently strengthening the Court’s position 
in the constitutional order and lending added legitimacy to its decisions.      
Upon closer inspection, however, the above image of judicial review as envisaged by 
those in support of judicial self-restraint is a distorted view of the role of the Court in resolving 
constitutional issues.  As many studies have shown, what the Court says does not end the 
debate over constitutional issues.153   Instead, judicial decisions are only a part of broad 
constitutional politics.  Sitting atop the judicial system, the Court may give a formal sense of 
finality to a legal controversy by its decision.154  But its opinion never evokes the majesty of 
a sovereign voice.  Once it announces its decision, it also subjects itself and its opinion to 
further public scrutiny.  Constitutional law and politics relate to each other not only before 
but also after the Court decides.  It is through this process that the constitution evolves.  
Desegregation, the continuing contention over abortion, and the equal protection of gay people, 
to name just a few, are examples of how significant constitutional issues have played out in the 
interaction among the public, the political departments, the Court, and even the states.155  
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Sometimes the Court responds to and codifies the result of social movement by its decision;156 
at other times its decision prompts citizen resistance and adds fuel to further mobilization.157 
Seen in this light, the Court is not supreme or sovereign.  Situated in constitutional 
jurisgenesis, the myth of judicial sovereignty dissipates. 
As part of constitutional jurisgenesis, there is no reason why the Court should be 
restrained from exercising its assigned power as it is never supreme.  Nor need it restrain itself 
for fear of politicization as a self-restrained Court can also be seen as a product of constitutional 
politics.  Rather, the Court should live up to what is expected of it: contributing to the building 
of a constitutional nomos through its interpretation of the constitution.  But at the same time 
the Court should not expect to give a definitive meaning to the constitution by settling a 
constitutional issue once and for all.  It has no control of its own decisions, the meaning of 
which will only materialize in the jurisgenerative process of constitutional politics.158  As 
Ackerman’s reconstruction of the civil rights revolution in the US shows,159  neither the 
historical statutes such as the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and the Voting Rights Act of 1965 nor 
the Court’s serial landmark decisions have defined the civil rights revolution.  Rather, it is 
constitutional politics in which those legislative and judicial decisions were situated that has 
given new meaning to the constitution by dismantling the Jim Crow system in American 
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South.160  In a nutshell, both judicial self-restraint and judicial activism should be understood 
as part of this jurisgenerative process and assessed within it. 
B. Lesson Two: Substantiate the Fiction of Popular Sovereignty with 
Constitutional Narratives 
I have pointed out why the concept of sovereignty contributes to the jurispathy of 
constitutional orders when sovereignty is identified with a single institution under a 
constitutional order, whether it is a separation of powers system like the US or a British-style 
parliamentary government.  Yet, despite being regarded as fictitious,161 the idea of popular 
sovereignty is central to all democratic governments—or so argues Waldron.162  How to 
realize this idea in a constitutional order has thus been the focus of constitutional scholarship.  
Some scholars associate it with a particular institutionalized constitutional power.  Dicey’s 
doctrine of parliamentary sovereignty is the prime example of the institutionalist approach.163  
Besides, in constitutional orders with strong-form judicial review, institutionalists debate 
whether the court or the parliament is the better agent of popular sovereignty.164  Other 
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scholars look to the constitutional structure itself instead of attributing popular sovereignty to 
a single constitutional power.  Ackerman is the representative structuralist.  In his view, the 
separation of powers of the US constitution itself is the constitutional design to identify when 
the people speaks.165  Still others focus attention on procedure.  Whether they appeal to 
‘democratic constitutionalism’166  or argue for ‘proceduralist democracy’, 167  the common 
theme for proceduralists is that popular sovereignty translates into the procedures of 
democratic decisionmaking. 
What unifies the various theories of popular sovereignty, including those centring on 
deliberative democracy and its corresponding version of jurisgenerative politics, is their formal 
approach, the focus of which is on how popular sovereignty comes into existence through a 
‘constitutional form’.168  Under this approach, the question of popular sovereignty is resolved 
into one of constitutional design: How can we make government decisions responsive to the 
citizenry through institution, structure, procedure or a combination of them all?  This is 
inevitably important to constitutional democracy.  Yet it leaves the principal of popular 
sovereignty out: Who are the people?  Focusing on the agent, whether it is understood in 
institutional, structural, or procedural terms, without identifying the principal, the formal 
approach fails to inspire a sense of authorship and only solidifies the fictitiousness of popular 
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sovereignty.169  To be clear, I am not alluding to any preconstitutional ethnos.  Rather, my 
emphasis is on the substantiation of the fiction of popular sovereignty through constitutional 
discourse.170   
Notably, Michel Rosenfeld suggests that constitutional discourse helps to articulate 
constitutional identity through the deployment of constructive tools such as negation, 
metaphor, and metonymy.171  Yet, through narratives about the constitution, which speak to 
the unfolding of the constitutional project and its purpose with emphasis on the agent and the 
chronological order of her acts under it, 172  constitutional discourse can help with the 
articulation of popular sovereignty in another way.  I have noted that Cover suggested that 
the court could become less jurispathic by committing itself to the ongoing project of nomos-
building with its substantive reasoning.  Through its opinion in which the people can identify 
themselves, the court reveals a constitutional nomos to the people.  In Rogers Smith’s term, 
judicial opinions speak the voice of popular sovereignty when they tell the ‘stories of 
peoplehood’. 173   In a nutshell, popular sovereignty is substantiated in the corpus of 
constitutional discourse (including nonjudicial government decisions or rulings) when it reads 
more like narratives, accounts, or stories of the people themselves than an essay of political 
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philosophy or a commentary on legal doctrines.174 
Granted, there is nothing new in the proposition that the government agencies, especially 
the court, shape the people’s identity through their decisions.175  It has also been well-argued 
that the legitimacy of the constitutional government depends on the reasoning and argument in 
support of its decisions.176  Yet the traditional focus has been on the ‘scientific’ character of 
reasoning and rational argument in constitutional discourse.177  What matters is that reasoning 
and argument must withstand the scrutiny of logical analysis and moral science.  Take judicial 
opinions for example.  Through the scientific lens, judicial opinions are treated like applied 
political theory,178 while the court is compared to a postgraduate seminar.179  This emphasis 
on the scientific aspect of constitutional discourse is further strengthened when it is viewed 
from a professional perspective.180  With respect to the relationship between the court and the 
public, judicial opinions are appreciated more in terms of the approval from the peer group of 
legal professionals (judges in particular) than for their giving voice to the people.181  Viewed 
thus, constitutional discourse reads like a citizenship guidebook of moral principles or a treatise 
on morality to be learnt by the people.  Failing to tell the people’s stories, however, neither a 
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citizenship guidebook nor a philosophical treatise comes close to the constitutional discourse 
in which the people can identify themselves. 
To make itself the expression of popular sovereignty, constitutional discourse needs not 
only to analytically articulate the moral principles the people hold dear but also to account for 
where those moral principles come from, how they are to be carried out in the present practice, 
and moreover, how they constitute and define the people.182  Judicial opinions, for example, 
need to absorb and contest but more important, enter into dialogue with the competing 
narratives and stories the people themselves tell of the moral principles.  In this way, 
narratives are not the opposite of rational argument and analytical reasoning.  Rather, both 
elements of constitutional discourse are essential to persuade the people to find themselves in 
the constitutional project.  By virtue of narratives, what emerges from judicial opinions and 
other constitutional discourse evokes a constitutional nomos in which the people can find the 
moral principles meaningful.  The people come into existence in constitutional discourse 
through the stories and narratives with which they can identify.  Aimed at nomos-building, 
the making of constitutional discourse should be treated as ‘a more ‘humanistic’ than 
‘scientific’ enterprise’.183 
With the above shift of orientation, an even broader concept of constitutional politics 
comes into sight.  Judicial opinions will no longer be the monopoly of the legal profession.  
Instead, judges will have to think about how to position themselves towards the people’s 
competing stories and how to incorporate those stories in their opinions in telling the official 
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story.  They will not only need to attend to the statements made by the opposing parties and 
their legal counsels but also to be open to the inputs from the general public, whether they are 
delivered in the form of an amicus curiae opinion or not.184  Looked at through this lens, 
judicial opinions will shape up as if they are a result of collective drafting.  They will not only 
be subject to the peer review of professional and academic lawyers but also to the public 
scrutiny of the people. Moreover, with the addition of constitutional narratives of peoplehood, 
constitutional discourse can turn into a medium of constitutional politics.185       
There are some issues yet to be clarified.  Take the judicial opinion again.  Like other 
types of constitutional discourse, the purpose of the judicial opinion is to persuade the citizen-
readers to accept its ruling.  It works towards this purpose in large part by virtue of rationalist 
argument and forensic reasoning.  Yet, as a ‘persuasive speech’, some scholars have 
suggested that to strengthen its persuasive force, the judicial opinion be styled as if it is a kind 
of storytelling or rhetoric.186  It may or may not be the case, but that is not what I have argued 
for the role of narratives in constitutional discourse.  My focus is on the substance of judicial 
opinions, not their style.  Another related issue is the ambiguities concerning the role of 
narratives in the judicial opinion itself.  Although narratives are instrumental in persuasion, 
storytelling has long been suspected of subverting the business of governance for its falsity, 
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irrationality, and seductiveness.187  Yet storytelling is not inherently inimical to governance.  
As Kenji Yoshino perceptively observes, it can be defended on the grounds of ‘virtue’, which 
even Plato did not repudiate outright.188  Narratives are defensible for their integrative role in 
bringing the judicial opinion closer to the people.189  To be sure, narratives do not necessarily 
make a judgement better, but they could render a judicial opinion more reflective of popular 
sovereignty.190 
It would take a real case and an entire ruling to illustrate how a judicial opinion could 
speak the voice of popular sovereignty with narratives.  Instead, I shall only point out how 
narratives can be brought into the judicial opinion as part of my attempt to reorient the legal 
vs political constitutionalism debate towards constitutional jurisgenesis.  From the 
perspective of narratives, the identity of the storyteller in a judicial opinion is pivotal to the 
persuasiveness of her narrative and to the constitutional nomos it projects.191   Thus, the 
account the court gives of its role in the constitutional order should be carefully considered.  
It should not be taken for granted or treated as a matter of legal technicalities.  Instead, the 
historical evolution of which the court has been part and in relation to which its jurisprudence 
currently stands should be addressed.  Notably, the judicial-self-account has existed as the 
lawyerly summary of the case law in judicial opinions.  Nevertheless, it does not have to be 
presented that way.  Rather, it can be laid out in historical narratives.  In this way, the court 
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situates itself in the collective story and memory of the people.  Its identity changes from the 
oracle of what the law is into a genuine participant in the discursive community. 192  In 
addition to the self-conscious re-presentation of its identity through narratives, the court can 
benefit from narratives when it gives account of fact.  It may not be easy to differentiate fact 
from law in a constitutional case.  But it is inescapable for the court to give account of legal/ 
constitutional fact in its judgment. 193   It is true that fact should be based on empirical 
evidence.  Yet empirical evidence plays a less important role than it seems, say, in the 
‘viability’ of a foetus in abortion cases in the US law194 as that issue concerns the so-called 
‘reviewable fact’ rather than ‘case-specific fact’.195  In this regard, the court may give more 
voice to narrative evidence or other accounts of experience presented by the ‘friends of the 
court’ in its account of fact in judicial opinions.196  These two examples suggest the direction 
in which narratives can make judicial opinions more inclusive and help to substantiate popular 
sovereignty in constitutional discourse. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
The political vs legal constitutionalism debate has broad implications to the global 
development of constitutionalism beyond the British constitutional context.  On the one hand, 
with the continuing spread of constitutionalism, the concept of global constitutionalism 
emerges but its meaning remains contentious.  At the core of the debate surrounding global 
constitutionalism is the institutional arrangement of the global constitutional order where law 
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and politics intersect.197  The long and winding saga of Kadi shows that the new global 
constitutional landscape cannot escape from the political vs legal constitutionalism debate as 
to the role of the court in the constitutional order.198  On the other hand, as human rights and 
other cosmopolitan values associated with global constitutionalism continue to penetrate 
domestic legal orders, it is noted that political constitutionalism has seen a revival.199  Against 
this broad backdrop the seemingly repetitious and very British debate surrounding political and 
legal constitutionalism deserves a fresh look, which I hope to give in this paper. 
As I have noted, the political vs legal constitutionalism debate has centred on whether 
and to what extent judicial review is beneficial to constitutionalism.  For political 
constitutionalists, constitutionalism thrives by keeping the court from interfering with the 
political process.  In this paper, I questioned this variety of political constitutionalism in light 
of Cover’s idea of constitutional nomos.  Drawing upon his deep understanding of the 
meaning of constitutional orders, I argued that the relationship between law and politics as 
envisaged by political constitutionalists is premised on a narrow understanding of 
constitutional politics, which fails to grasp the broad political process that includes both the 
parliament and the court.  To move towards an alternative non-court-centred version of 
political constitutionalism, constitutional theory should reconsider the role of institutional 
sovereignty in rethinking the relationship between law and politics in constitutional orders.   
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I agree with political constitutionalists that to realize the meaning of constitutionalism, 
we need to look beyond judicial review.  Yet I disagree with their institutionalist view that 
reduces the complex dynamic of law and politics in a constitutional order to the operation of 
the parliament.  Learning from Cover, political constitutionalists should shift focus from the 
institutional relationship between the court and the legislature to the way that they can 
contribute to the broader politics of constitutional jurigenesis.  The first step towards 
constitutional jurisgenesis is to reconsider the idea of institutional sovereignty.  The received 
doctrine or principle of institutional sovereignty in the guise of parliamentary sovereignty or 
judicial supremacy is a function of the legislative or the judicial power giving voice to the 
constitutional visions that are forming among citizens. 
Furthermore, moving to this new understanding of constitutional politics, we can also 
rethink how constitutional democracy acts out the idea of popular sovereignty through 
constitutional discourse.  Notably, Cover’s idea of jurisgenerative constitutional politics as I 
present in this paper is distinct from the Habermasian proceduralist version.  Through the lens 
of Cover’s constitutional jurisgenesis, the meaning of the constitution does not end where 
scientific, rational argument stops.  Rather, it is constantly enriched through a variety of 
narratives flowing in the political community.  As the meaning of the constitution is what we 
should be concerned about, we need to extend the reach of constitutional discussion to those 
not so scientific but meaning-enriching constitutional narratives.  Confronting constitutional 
scholars with his existential critique of political order, the self-claimed anarchist Cover 
broadens the boundary of constitutionalism and enriches our understanding of constitutional 
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politics.200  Constitutional jurisgenesis is not only about procedure.  Rather, substantive 
values and justice are what matters in jurisgenerative constitutional politics.201  For this robust 
version of political constitutionalism we can learn a lot from Cover even thirty years after his 
untimely death. 
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